By Suleyman A. Ndanusa PhD OON
The story of Nigeria’s financial technology can be told through a small change in an ordinary day. A person who once had to travel with cash can now receive money, pay a bill or send funds across the country from a phone. A trader can take a digital payment; a family can move money after business hours; a bank can settle a transfer in seconds. These moments do not make headlines one by one. Together, they describe a country that has spent nearly two decades building new ways for money to move.
That journey began with infrastructure and a policy choice. In 2007, the Central Bank of Nigeria began developing the Payments System Vision 2020, with the aim of creating an electronic payments system used across the country and recognised internationally. NIBSS Instant Payment followed in 2011, bringing real time account to account transfers into everyday banking. In the years that followed, the country added agent banking, mobile money, interoperable switching, wider point of sale access, bank verification and digital onboarding. Each layer widened the places and moments in which people could enter the formal financial system. The story was not simply one of new apps. It was a sequence of rules, shared infrastructure, bank participation and private innovation (CBN, 2026)
The scale of that work is now visible. The CBN’s 2026 fintech report says the NIBSS Instant Payment platform processed close to 11 billion transactions in 2024, up from about five billion in 2022. EFInA’s 2026 Access to Financial Services survey found that formal financial inclusion had risen from 64 per cent in 2023 to 73 per cent in 2026; overall inclusion, including informal services, reached 79 per cent. Mobile money use more than tripled, from 12 per cent of adults in 2023 to 38 per cent in 2026. These figures tell a genuine national success story: more people can reach a financial service, more often, through more channels (CBN, 2026; EFInA, 2026).
But the next chapter asks a different question. What can people do once they are connected? A payment rail makes it possible to send and receive money. It does not, by itself, tell a lender whether a customer can repay a loan, provide a safe way to borrow, or give that customer a record that can improve future access to credit. Nigeria has become good at moving money. The larger task is to help more households and businesses build reliable financial relationships around that movement.
The distance between access and credit is plain in the recent data. EFInA reports that formal borrowing increased from 6 per cent of adults in 2023 to 10 per cent in 2026, while formal saving rose from 38 per cent to 53 per cent. The two forms of participation are moving forward at different speeds. Credit use is growing, but it remains limited; and 40.8 per cent of formal borrowing in 2026 was for coping or consumption rather than productive activity (EFInA, 2026). That finding does not mean such borrowing is unnecessary. It means that a credit system must be judged by whether it helps people manage real needs without trapping them in costs they cannot carry.
The wider economy helps explain why credit has been difficult to deepen. The World Bank’s 2025 Nigeria Development Update put banking sector credit to the public and private sectors at 26.6 per cent of GDP in 2024, among the lowest levels in its peer group. A separate World Bank assessment put domestic credit to Nigeria’s private sector at 12.9 per cent of GDP, below the Sub-Saharan African average of 20.1 per cent and the lower middle income country average of 34 per cent (World Bank, 2025;). The measures cover different parts of the credit market, but both point to a system in which lending is relatively shallow and long-term funding is scarce. In that setting, banks tend to favour borrowers with collateral, steady salaries or a long relationship with the institution. Many Nigerians earn and repay in ways that do not fit those familiar tests.
Nigeria does not lack credit cards. Bank issued products exist, card networks and payment infrastructure operate in the country, and the CBN’s card rules explicitly cover credit card issuance and use. The more precise concern is that credit cards remain a small and uneven part of the wider financial ecosystem. The CBN’s own overview of payment modes describes credit cards as the least used payment card type in Nigeria and points to stringent eligibility conditions and collateral requirements. For scale, a published compilation of World Bank Global Findex data estimates that credit card ownership rose from 1.6 per cent of Nigerian adults aged 15 and over in 2021 to 3.2 per cent in 2024. These are survey estimates of ownership, not counts of active cards, unique users, available credit or outstanding balances. The increase is encouraging, but the latest estimate still indicates that card ownership reaches only a small share of adults (CBN, 2014; CBN, n.d.-b; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2022; FinStatGlobe, 2026; Klapper et al., 2025).
The public data also leave an important gap. The CBN’s published e-payment statistics report activity by channels such as ATM, POS, web transfers and mobile apps, but do not provide a separate current series for credit card accounts, active cardholders, balances or card specific arrears (CBN, n.d.-a). The latest Global Findex ownership estimate is useful, but it cannot show how many cards are currently active, how much Nigerians owe on them or how repayment quality is changing. A serious national conversation should therefore pair the available evidence with a call for regular, clearly defined reporting: cards issued and active, unique cardholders, total credit limits and balances, purchase and cash advance use, arrears, defaults, pricing and complaint outcomes. Those measures would help distinguish nominal card issuance from useful, affordable credit access.
A credit card is better understood as one possible bridge between payments and a reusable line of short-term credit. A customer pays participating merchants with the card, the issuing bank settles the purchase through the network, and the customer repays the bank under an agreed schedule. If the customer pays on time and the issuer reports that performance accurately, the account can begin to create a formal repayment history. That history may help the customer qualify for a suitable limit or other forms of credit later. If repayment capacity is misjudged, terms are opaque or interest compounds beyond the customer’s means, the same card can become a channel into persistent debt.
The link to macroeconomic development is real, but it is indirect and conditional. Financial development can support growth when it lowers the cost of information and transactions, mobilises savings, allocates capital to viable uses and helps firms invest and create jobs. Well designed credit can also help households manage shocks without derailing essential spending. A credit card’s direct contribution is narrower: it provides a payment instrument, short-term liquidity and a record of repayment. Consumer cards alone cannot substitute for business lending, long-term investment finance, stable incomes or macroeconomic stability. They can contribute to development when they strengthen responsible financial intermediation and produce benefits for households and merchants, rather than simply increasing balances owed (World Bank, 2016; World Bank, 2022).
For a card system to work, the customer must know who is lending and who is responsible when something goes wrong. Bank issued card credit sits within the CBN’s framework for banks and card operations. The FCCPC’s Digital, Electronic, Online or Non-Traditional Consumer Lending Regulations, known as the DEON Regulations, address covered digital and non traditional consumer lending arrangements; they should not be presented as the main rules for bank issued credit cards. The DEON Regulations’ definition excludes banks and financial institutions licensed under BOFIA. In any partnership, the actual lender and each firm’s obligations should be made clear to customers and regulators (CBN, 2014, 2020; FCCPC, 2025).
The licensed issuer should assess affordability, set and review the credit limit, provide statements, report repayment, manage collections and handle complaints. A retailer, airline, fintech or other partner may bring the product to customers, provide technology or offer rewards. A card scheme supplies common network rules, while acquirers and processors connect merchants and route transactions. These roles can be shared across firms, but responsibility for the credit account should remain visible and enforceable.
Nigeria’s own credit trajectory will depend on more than issuing plastic or adding a “credit” function to a mobile wallet. Lenders need accurate and usable credit information, consistent reporting of successful as well as missed repayments, and a way to correct errors. With customers’ consent, cash flow data may help assess people whose earnings come from trading, contract work or multiple income sources rather than a single monthly salary. Such data should be limited to a clear purpose, protected against misuse and accompanied by understandable reasons when an application is declined or a limit is set. Good identity data helps establish who is applying; it does not, by itself, establish whether that person can afford to repay.
The African comparisons are instructive precisely because they do not offer a single model to copy. Kenya built one of the world’s best known mobile money ecosystems, yet the Central Bank of Kenya’s payment card series counted about 342,000 credit cards alongside roughly 10.7 million debit cards in August 2026 (CBK, 2026). The categories are card counts, not unique cardholders, and they say nothing by themselves about affordability or use. They do show that a country can have vibrant digital finance without credit cards becoming the dominant instrument. For Nigeria, the lesson is to develop credit cards where they meet a real need, while allowing transfers, mobile money and other tools to remain useful in their own right.
South Africa offers a different perspective. In its 2023 payments study, the South African Reserve Bank found that 8 per cent of adults in its nationally representative consumer survey had a credit card. In that survey, credit cards accounted for a small share of payment volume and value, and ownership was concentrated among
higher income consumers (SARB, 2024). The study is a reminder that a more mature banking market does not automatically make credit cards universal or equitable. Nigeria should pay attention to the way access, acceptance and affordability vary by income, geography and type of work, rather than treating the number of cards issued as the measure of success.
The United States and the United Kingdom offer useful lessons about the institutional architecture of card credit, alongside cautions about its costs. In the United States, the issuer can remain the lender even when a retailer or airline designs the brand and rewards programme. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau monitors the market and publishes information on card terms from more than 150 issuers twice a year (CFPB, 2026). That kind of transparency can help consumers compare products and allow supervisors to see how the market is changing. Yet the US experience is not a target for Nigeria to reproduce. The CFPB reported that interest charges on credit cards exceeded $160 billion in 2024 (CFPB, 2025). Market scale can coexist with expensive debt.
The United Kingdom adds a useful conduct principle. Its Financial Conduct Authority’s Consumer Duty expects firms to act in good faith, avoid foreseeable harm and support customers’ financial objectives. Its affordability guidance also asks lenders to consider whether borrowers can repay and how open ended credit may affect their financial position (FCA, 2026; FCA, n.d.). For Nigeria, these examples suggest that a durable card market needs more than a licence and a disclosure form. It needs clear accountability, fair value assessment, understandable terms, careful marketing, proportionate collections and a functioning route to redress.
A Nigerian card ecosystem could begin modestly. Regulated issuers could test low limit cards for customers with limited credit histories, secured cards that provide a first step for some borrowers, and charge cards that require full repayment. Over time, a customer who demonstrates reliable repayment might qualify for a higher limit or a different repayment option. Salary linked underwriting can continue to serve customers for whom it works, while careful cash flow assessment opens a path for some self employed people and workers with variable income. A pilot should report not only the number of accounts opened, but also who receives them, what they cost, how reliably they are accepted, how disputes are resolved and whether customers can repay without sustained hardship.
The sequence of reform matters. First, the CBN and industry should clarify the responsibilities of issuers and their partners, standardise the information customers receive, and agree on basic expectations for fraud response, complaints, data reporting and settlement. Next, banks and licensed partners could test products with small limits and publish aggregate outcomes, including fees, delinquency, complaints and dispute resolution. If the evidence shows that customers are benefiting and lenders can manage risk, issuance could expand across more institutions and merchant categories. If it does not, the design should change before the market scales.
There are risks to face openly. Credit cards can help people manage timing between income and expenses, but they can also make it easy to carry costly balances from month to month. Automated underwriting may widen access while disadvantaging people whose income is irregular or whose data is incomplete. Fraud can damage trust in a system that depends on digital credentials. A co-branded or app based product can also obscure which firm actually lends. Limits should therefore reflect repayment capacity; prices and repayment examples should be clear; personal data should be protected; and customers should have a practical way to freeze a card, challenge a transaction and seek help when circumstances change.
The measure of progress should be the quality of financial participation, not simply its volume. Nigeria’s fintech journey has shown that thoughtful infrastructure, shared standards and broad collaboration can change how a country transacts. Its credit journey will ask for a similar effort, but with a different test: can the system extend useful credit to more people without confusing access with wellbeing or growth with over borrowing? A well designed bank issued credit card system may be one part of that answer. It should grow only where responsible underwriting, reliable data, fair pricing and consumer protection grow with it. Research on credit inclusion finds that rapid expansion in the number of borrowers is not usually destabilising on its own, but can become a warning sign when it coincides with a broader credit boom. That is a reason to expand in stages and monitor arrears, repayment burdens and bank asset quality alongside account growth (IMF, 2026; BIS, 2022).
The invitation, then, is to begin a national conversation about the next financial chapter. Regulators, banks, fintech firms, card networks, merchants, consumer groups and researchers can ask together what a Nigerian credit card system should make possible, who it should serve, and which protections should be in place before it expands. The country has already built much of the machinery for payments. The opportunity now is to decide how that achievement can support trusted credit, broader economic participation and stronger financial resilience.
Suleyman A. Ndanusa, PhD, OON, is an economist, lawyer, strategic studies scholar, and public policy thinker and practitioner with extensive experience in financial markets, regulation, governance, national Security and development
